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Abstract: This article reconstructs Albert Camus’s notion of the absurd in order to elucidate 
his critique of historical teleology. In his life and work, Camus endeavoured to develop a 
fallibilist historical sensibility suitable to a cosmos shorn of meaning, which led him to reject 
ideas of progress and their traces of messianism when elaborating his treatment of rebellion. 
By making use of Camus’s ideas about the absurd and rebellion, I suggest that these two 
themes productively unsettle contemporary cosmopolitanism as a teleological orthodoxy of 
human progress and fruitfully if paradoxically lie at the heart of a concept of 
cosmopolitanism “without hope”. 
 








The recent revitalization of cosmopolitanism appears to be motivated largely by the wish to 
make sense of and respond to intensifying global interdependence and its (dis)integrative 
effects, including transformations of sovereignty, cultural hybridity, complex patterns of 
identity and attachment, and multiple scales of economies.
1
 Despite differences of 
interpretation and normative emphasis, cosmopolitan discourses share a common sense of 
belonging to the world as a whole, a distinctive “way of being in the world”2 underscored by 
the traditional cosmopolitan notion of the polites of the kosmos. In what follows, I argue that 
the thought of Albert Camus can serve as a compelling source for a certain “rebellious” 
notion of cosmopolitanism that runs against the grain of recent accounts of cosmopolitan 
ethics and politics. In particular, I contend that Camus’s ideas about the absurd and rebellion 
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bring a provocative, but nonetheless cosmopolitan perspective to bear on our understanding 
of an indifferent world. I also explore the ways that Camus’s radical critique of historical 
teleology unsettles contemporary cosmopolitanism as an orthodoxy of human progress, and 
propose revising the cosmopolitan outlook by putting aside the teleological temptation and 
delineating a Camusian cosmopolitanism “without hope”. I conclude by examining several 
dispositional characteristics involved in cultivating an attitude or ethos of rebellious 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
The Absurd and the Teleological Temptation 
 
In a series of articles entitled “Neither Victims nor Executioners” published in November 
1946, Camus averred that “the new world order that we are seeking cannot be merely national 
or even continental, much less Western or Eastern. It has to be universal”.3 Camus was 
deeply distraught by the violence, fear and poverty that were quickly entrenched in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and exacerbated by the ensuing global conflict between 
the twin ideological camps of communism and capitalism. Camus warned against modernist 
ideologies that foster polarized views of the world and a generalized distrust of humanity, 
divided into allies and adversaries. Like many internationalist or cosmopolitan thinkers at the 
time, he objects to the anachronistic mentality of “being asked to love or to hate one or 
another country or people”,4 and he presents the reshaping of democratic justice and freedom 
as the key to uniting people within and across borders. He appealed to an awareness that 
“there are no more islands and . . . borders are meaningless”, such “that the nations of the 
world share a common destiny”.5 
 At the same time, Camus found deeply unpalatable the teleologically driven 
metaphysics of historical progress inscribed within the dominant ethico-political doctrines of 
modernity. In his analysis of the absurd, he deals with how philosophical, moral and political 
systems sustain or legitimate their claim to authority by reference to the course of historical 
processes. In his view, the absurd poignantly denotes the relational dissonance between the 
human longing for rational certitude and the unyielding muteness of the cosmos. As he puts it 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, “It happens that the stage set collapses . . . in a universe suddenly 
divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy, 
since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This 
divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of 
absurdity”.6 The sense of the absurd, that human living is emptied of all non-contingent 
meaning, engenders a profound disorientation by rupturing worldviews that ground human 
purpose in an immutable, higher outcome. With this dislocation of transcendent sources of 
value and axiomatic starting points in metaphysical and moral truths, nihilism becomes 
widely ingrained in the fabric of modern socio-political life. According to Camus, the logic of 
nihilism amounts to believing that the world’s absurd injustices and suffering require 
renouncing the world itself; nihilism, in other words, is bitter scorn of the world as it is. In 
contrast, Camus proposes that since the absurd cannot be overcome, it must serve as a “point 
of departure” that stimulates our efforts to humanize the world without resorting to rationalist 
models of teleological action that reintroduce “absolute and consolatory myths” about the 
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 To thus affirm, rather than negate, the absurdity of the human condition, 
Camus discerns the necessity for “a confrontation and an unceasing struggle”,8 meaning that 
the refusal to negate the absurd is complemented by a need to be reconciled to it as the limit 
or finitude of the human condition. On the one hand, accepting the absurd as defining the 
human condition involves transforming consciousness away from viewing history as 
amenable to rational manipulation, while, on the other hand, refusing any conception of 
politics as justified by teleological aspirations prevents the sense of the absurd from leading 
to either nihilist or rationalist heroism. Just as the absurd nourishes resistance, resistance 
nurtures a chastened attachment to the world’s limitations. Simultaneously with and against 
the absurd, lucid thinking and acting must rebel against servility to a telos without either 
hoping finally to overcome the incompleteness of the human condition or despairing that this 
boundedness cannot be transcended completely. For Camus, the freedom to rebel is thus 
made meaningful by the absurd world “in all its splendour and diversity”.9 
 The Myth of Sisyphus is, then, more than Camus’s attempt to explain the absurd; it is 
the background against which he defined his mode of historical understanding. Wanting to 
avoid the absolutism of both nihilism and rationalism, he concludes that the shared values of 
integrity, dignity and rebellion are socially fashioned, but are neither merely arbitrary nor 
underpinned by transcendent guarantees of objectivity. Human beings require meaning in 
order to make sense of the world, and Camus argues that the meaning that we derive from 
and ascribe to our experience is constructed. Yet he holds that this does not make meaning 
arbitrary because we find ourselves always already situated within and conditioned by 
historically-formed constellations of meaning. These “given” meanings provide our 
fundamental bearings in the absurd world and help sustain us in that world, but at the same 
time, Camus maintains, we must accept that they are contingent and therefore amenable to 
contestation and transformation. For Camus, this worldly fabric of meanings provides the 
creative materials for iterative practices of interpretation of our moral and political claims, 
and exhibits a conditioned freedom that both shapes and limits ethical and political potentials. 
In maintaining this moderate or fallibilist historical understanding, he insists there can be no 
appeal to a telos to ground our sense of history and search for meaning, no endpoint that 
justifies everything (or indeed anything). He suggests that the modern temptation to view 
history as the totality of progress associated with strictly objective “laws” – of historical, 
economic, or developmental necessity – is a kind of “secularization of the ideal” which all 
dominant political forces of the twentieth century, whether of the Left or the Right, 
championed in their desire to claim “the direction of the future of the human race”.10 Here 
Camus comes remarkably close to Walter Benjamin’s description of “messianic time” as a 
progressivist model of history developing into a final meaning, which then provides a 
transcendent meta-causal reference by which to legitimate events in the past and ethico-
political choices in the present.
11
 
 Framed in this manner, I suggest, Camus’s sense of the absurd has great resonance for 
contemporary cosmopolitanism. Camus alerts us to the implicit or explicit teleologies that 
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lurk within modern political doctrines that propound narratives of the progress of world 
history toward the fulfillment of the latent promise of humanity, and which have a direct 
bearing on the normative character of interpersonal and political relations. And the 
cosmopolitan vision is no stranger to this lure of teleology. Most notably, in “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”,12 Immanuel Kant takes up the task of 
reconceptualizing history as the actualization of the telos of human freedom in the form of a 
cosmopolitan world-republic. Kant’s account portrays the process of human history as the 
gradual manifestation of universal reason in concrete legal, economic and political 
institutions, such as a federation of republican nations and human rights, which progressively 
encompass the globe as a geospatial totality. Throughout his writings on cosmopolitanism, 
Kant speculates about how this teleology might be at work in society and history – as 
expressions of “a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind”13 – to assist in 
bringing about perpetual peace. While he admits that we can only reflectively impute such 
teleological development to be at work, he is clear that the ultimate goal of cosmopolitan 
right should be regarded heuristically as the purposive unity of nature that gradually drives 
historical progress, and in the end will prevail.
14
 This assumption strongly reflects the modern 
drive to ascertain stable, unambiguous epistemological foundations and ethical standards, and 
a corresponding inability to conceive of absurdity as an inherent aspect of the ethical 
moment. 
 Kant’s teleological legacy became further entrenched in the modernist cosmopolitan 
imaginary through the work of numerous influential figures. Hegel’s cosmopolitanism, for 
instance, coincides with a philosophy of world history as the progressive movement of states 
towards ever higher stages of freedom, culminating in the rule of Reason circumscribing the 
totality of the world and, with it, the end of history.
15
 Similarly, Marx and Engels envisioned 
communism as a materialist, dialectical and emancipatory project of cosmopolitan collective 
subject-formation arising alongside the borderless expansion of capital “over the whole 
surface of the earth”, which thereby ensures the “impossibility” of all “national one-sidedness 
and narrow-mindedness”.16  
More recently, Jürgen Habermas has taken up Kant’s argument that a developmental 
trend to strengthen the republican constitutions of states internally will gradually limit 
hostility within and between nations.
17
 Of course, Habermas is aware that the consolidation 
of a cosmopolitan public right of and for humanity poses numerous complex issues beyond 
the regulation of conflict, but he foregrounds his assumption that a cosmopolitanism 
anchored in a universal core of democracy and rights constitutes a condition of possibility for 
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the progressive development of humankind. Other contemporary cosmopolitans, such as 
Andrew Linklater, while eschewing any crude historical causality, nevertheless remain 
willing to ascribe a progressive developmental course to human history as a whole. 
Increasing global interconnectedness and a concomitant universal consciousness of 
humanity’s capacity to harm and be harmed, Linklater claims, are part of a “scaling up” of 
human organization indicative of a world historical evolution that is “almost certain to 
continue” to a cosmopolitan endpoint.18 
 Camus sought to undermine such understandings of history as a developmental 
process towards a universalist end amenable to rational control. Modern approaches to 
politics, he argues, share a particular teleological form, combining belief in the efficacy of 
instrumental rationality with faith in the ability to lead humanity to its singular historical 
destiny. From world communism to global capitalism, from pan-nationalism to “new” 
cosmopolitanism, hope in the future ultimately presupposes the flow of a historical process 
towards a privileged endpoint. For Camus, both feeding into and sprouting from such 
doctrines is a desperation to endow the cosmos with absolute meaning, which can only be 
disappointed. It is striking that even Kant concludes, near the end of “Idea for a Universal 
History”, that it “is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history 
according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain 
rational ends; it would seem that only a novel could result from such premises”.19 Kant and 
his cosmopolitan descendants have largely turned their backs on this inkling of the absurd. 
 
Cosmopolitanism without Hope 
 
I have suggested above that modern and contemporary cosmopolitan theories presuppose an 
explicit or tacit teleology, as if all historical events are somehow heading for the arrival of a 
rationally integrated system of global cosmopolitanism and universal humanity. As Richard 
Falk opines, the “idea about making the world better through a set of proposals”, prevalent 
within modern cosmopolitanism, “implies a utopian confidence in the human capacity to 
exceed realistic horizons”.20 This is an uneasy yet worthwhile observation, insofar as many 
(though certainly not all) cosmopolitan theorists pronounce their vision to be 
unproblematically “progressive” in both descriptive and normative senses. Yet in constituting 
cosmopolitanism in historically progressivist terms, the actuality of multiple forms of 
cosmopolitanism in the present becomes subordinated to the possibility of a singular form of 
cosmopolitanism in the future. The belief in the historical progression of cosmopolitanism 
towards ever more rational, justifiable and efficient forms sets the tone for a discourse that 
ends up portraying cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal circumscribed by an inevitable 
telos. Placing our hopes in bringing about a cosmopolitan global order by means of rationalist 
efficacy conceals an escapist “leap of faith”,21 which inevitably carries the burden of a 
deterministic teleology. The teleological imperative displaces the ambivalences and 
ambiguities of what it may mean to “be” cosmopolitan onto an agenda of problem-solving 
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projects, and thereby treats the present merely as a vehicle for implementing the future.
22
 It is 
not my (or Camus’s) purpose simply to condemn these projects or the positive 
accomplishments of, for instance, movements for human rights and social justice. But it is 
crucial to note the dangerous slippage within modernist versions of cosmopolitanism from the 
aspiration of global political success to the temptation to formulate teleologically-weighted 
policy prescriptions and rationally efficient outcomes. In its drive to prove its “practical 
worth” by focusing on policy and “problem solving” as legitimating its ethical and political 
value, the “value” of cosmopolitanism becomes tainted by the modernist imperative to 
intervene in socio-political existence for purposes of creating ever more certain futures.
23
 
 Can one detach cosmopolitanism from a telos of historical ontology, from its deeply 
ingrained teleological idea of progress? Given his wariness of rational systems of thought, 
Camus often interpreted the human condition and the tensions between a moderate historical 
sensibility of limits and a teleological messianism of boundlessness, through figures and 
myths of classical antiquity. Ancient myth resonates with Camus because, he claims, “Greek 
thought is not historical”.24 Prometheus, for example, figures prominently in his work. On the 
one hand, by stealing fire from the gods and giving it to humankind, Prometheus rebelled 
against Zeus in the name of human empowerment and the “noble promise” of human 
emancipation.
25
 On the other hand, by exalting human mastery over the earth and by 
worshiping a vision of messianic transcendence – thus delivering “mortals” from the 
weaknesses of finitude and instilling the “blind hopes” of certainty into their hearts and minds 
– Prometheus undermines the idea of balance. For Camus, however, the myth of Prometheus 
does not express a simple Manichaean dichotomy between good and evil; rather, Prometheus 
evokes the inherent ambiguity of humanism and humanistic politics. The Promethean 
aspirations of humanism embody both the promise of cures for present and future ills, and the 
menace of the dark sides of progress. In the modern world, Camus suggests, the Promethean 
empowerment of humans for their own sake can always nurture friendship and solidarity as 
well as unleash ideologies that produce intellectual, economic and political servitude as the 
price of “development”.26 In a word, Prometheus “is both just and unjust”.27 
 Other myths, notably those of Sisyphus and Nemesis, supplement the Promethean one 
for Camus. Nemesis contributes the notions of moderation and limit,
28
 and Sisyphus 
symbolizes the refusal of utility and achievement in the face of the common human condition 
of the absurd. Camus concludes that we “must imagine Sisyphus happy”.29 This is because 
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Sisyphus powerfully portrays reconciliation with the absurd, and thus embodies a non-
pessimistic judgement of human existence that goes “nowhere”, as well as non-reconciliation 
with teleological doctrines that aspire to escape the absurd, and hence enacts a liberation from 
the worship of history as something instrumentally directed towards a hopeful end. 
Sisyphus’s activity is not divine: it leads nowhere, it perfects nothing, it produces neither 
linear development nor ultimate redemption. And yet it refuses the negative judgement of that 
state of affairs as futile, it assumes responsibility for an absurd existence rather than 
attempting to step out of it by forcing it to fit into a historical process, and it affirms the 
present without relying on the anticipatory hope of a future better world. The most sweeping 
yet significant implication for cosmopolitanism of Camus’s reading of Sisyphus is that we 
must make a choice about which vision is to be given primacy: a teleological 
cosmopolitanism of hope, or an a-teleological cosmopolitanism without hope. 
 Camus offers a way of thinking about existence that preserves a cosmopolitan sense 
of ethical and political resistance to domination and inequality while illuminating contingent 
moments in the present where cosmopolitan attitudes and practices can be enacted, without 
totalizing them into a teleological metaphysics of progressive reason. Such a cosmopolitan 
disposition is cultivated, I suggest, through the appropriation of the image of Sisyphean 
“hopelessness” which, Camus stresses, “has nothing to do with despair”30: live for the world 
today without any consolatory faith in transcendent ontologies of history. The notion of 
relinquishing “hope” – which is an idea that suggests the value of the present is fulfilled only 
by the realization of a potential in the future, and which therefore becomes endlessly deferred 
to “tomorrow” – needs to be emphasized in cosmopolitan thinking. Throughout his 
Notebooks, Camus writes that the postulate of freedom becomes illusory when it is justified 
with a view to achieving predefined “future goals”, and is conferred meaning solely by the 
functional transformation of the present into a future grandeur. From this point of view, the 
present is reduced to nothing. Consequently, to refuse the subordination of freedom and 
affirm the present is to adopt a posture of living “without tomorrows [sans lendemains]”.31 It 
is pertinent to ask whether cosmopolitans fully consider how awareness of the absurd limit of 
finitude may derail our taking responsibility in the present, when so much emphasis is placed 
on the eventual arrival of a better tomorrow. “Hope” in the future is not a brute fact, and it 
may in fact appear in consciousness as the inability to answer to the present from the secure 
vantage point of an aspirational future. If the concept of “progress” is a disease of reason, 
then the idea of “hope” is the irrational contagion. We may push this Camusian line of 
thinking to argue that only a coherent absurdist sensibility occasions a genuinely 
cosmopolitan sense of responsibility, because it demands unwavering fidelity to the world as 
it is while constantly discriminating between decisions and actions that either humanize or 
dehumanize the world in the present. Put in a different way, cosmopolitan responsibility to 
the “here and now” eschews justificatory logics of “hope” where the present can always be 
redeemed in the limitless certainty of the “next world”. 
 If cosmopolitanism is to “abolish hope”32 and thereby shed the tyranny of telos, then 
its choices, commitments and actions can rest only on the fleeting moments of time no longer 
conceived under the unifying arc of world history. Where some theorists like Martha 
Nussbaum think of cosmopolitanism as a rationalist tradition whose universalist and impartial 
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duties are premised on the primacy of reason inherent in every human being,
33
 Camus 
suggests instead that a cosmopolitan outlook issues from a mad love of the world as it is in 
spite of the absurdly tragic character of its many injustices. Ethically and politically, love of 
the world limned by the absurd is the first step towards refusing to accept all that degrades 
liberty and justice in present circumstances – which is a conviction that cannot be dictated by 
“formal virtue”. Rebellion, Camus goes on to say, “cannot exist without a strange form of 
love. Those who find no rest in God or in history are condemned to live for those who, like 
themselves, cannot live: in fact, for the humiliated”.34 
 
Rebellion and the Cosmopolitan Disposition 
 
Such a Camus-inspired view has deep consequences for cosmopolitanism because, with its 
normative vision unsettled, one can claim that existence ought not to be assimilated into an 
abstract universal telos, but should open itself up to “the fixed and radiant point of the 
present”35 shared in common by the humiliated and the humiliators, the oppressed and the 
oppressors. Contrary to viewing rebellion as the inevitable unfolding of history’s underlying 
processes, Camus suggests that we see it as an expression of generalized refusal in response 
to specific situations of oppression and suffering, and thus as an action that is initiated anew 
in the face of every situationally-unique injustice. Although Camus does not reject the aim of 
achieving greater freedom and justice,
36
 he refuses the notion of the “implacable reign of 
necessity” as the motivation for political action.37 Rather than the goal of attaining an “end” 
with reference to the course of history, it is the reality of suffering in current contexts that 
motivates rebellions in the present. Rebellion, as Camus envisions it, seizes the chances for 
justice in the here and now rather than deferring justice to a future to which judgement and 
action are subjugated “in order to obey history”.38 In effect, Camus calls for permanent 
rebellion as delimited confrontations with specific attempts to deny human freedom and 
dignity. Consequently, Camus’s account of rebellion is best understood as post-teleological 
insofar as it endorses the conditional character of human judgements and actions which, for 
that reason, can never be absolute or final. Rebellion, for Camus, contains an inherent 
measure limiting what can be done in the pursuit of freedom and justice. It does not disallow 
political projects but renders them provisional, partial and always contestable, subject to an 
ethical and political imperative of resisting any attempt to project the grand concept of 
“progress” onto worldly political commitments. Rebellion thus has its own specific reasons 
and outcomes, relative to the irreducibly plural spectrum of contexts and periods of time.
39
 
 Starting out from the experience of the absurd, Camus proposes a decidedly non-
teleological mode of ethical and political action in terms of the phenomenology of rebellion. 
He captures this quality by describing what he takes to be our actual experience of being 
violated and degraded. In The Rebel, he charts a course between nihilism and historicism by 
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beginning with rebellion as a sensible phenomenon which bespeaks a context of human 
coexistence as a result of our situatedness in the world. Through a critical appropriation of 
Hegelian thought that sheds its dialectical pretensions, Camus maintains that the master-slave 
relationship brings to light that in daring to defy the oppression of the master, the rebel 
urgently “affirms the existence of a borderline” or experiential limit between the tolerable 
and the intolerable.
40
 The rebel both asserts the value of some aspect of his or her being – 
prior to any theoretical formulation of morality – and condemns any assault on this aspect of 
self beyond the limit of the tolerable; the rebel thus “says yes and no simultaneously”.41 More 
importantly, however, the rebel’s simultaneous affirmation and rejection is directed not only 
at being a slave individually, but at “the condition of slavery” more generally.42 Every act of 
rebellion thus contains within it a relative judgement of a particular situation that directs upon 
it a concretely universal concern of love for others’ freedom, equality and reciprocity. It thus 
affirms the basic goodness of life for all and ascribes to others a right to rebel in rejecting the 
injustices of the world without, however, condemning the world itself. From this Camus 
concludes that through rebellion the tyranny of the “either/or” in the master-slave relationship 
is reconstituted as an emancipatory “neither/nor”, neither master nor slave, which can serve 
as a basis for judging the limits that action must establish for itself. This concurrent 
expression of both refusal and assent, both “yes” and “no”, constitutes a balance or tension – 
what Camus calls “measure” and portrays by the figure of Nemesis43 – that animates the 
continual interrogation of quotidian ethics and politics. Camus argues that the joint 
experience of the limit between the tolerable and intolerable, keyed to our physical integrity 
and recognition of our autonomous status, constitutes the socially fashioned minimum of a 
broadly shared meaning of what makes for a properly human existence. Yet the condition of 
the absurd always shrouds such meaning in ambiguity, leaving it open to plural and 
sometimes clashing interpretations. This view therefore sets aside any assertions of 
transcendent law, nature and history, but it does provide the existential ground for dialogue, 
debate and critique about the meaning of the human condition, capable of fostering both 
differing views and some minimal shared beliefs about ethical and political matters across 
diverse communities. 
 To capture further the attitude or ethos of rebellion, I will conclude by tracing some 
aspects of Camus’s thought which speak to the dispositional characteristics that can be 
harnessed by a cosmopolitanism without hope, focussing on the features that make for 
contextually-grounded choices and actions in a Camusian cosmopolitanism. What must be 
underscored is that these characteristics are not to be conceived as means to the larger end of 
advancing history, insofar as they find their rightful place in human relationships in the world 
as it is now. The first of these is an acknowledgement of difference and the experience of 
strangeness as resisting the reduction of human plurality to uniformity. Camus introduces this 
theme when he writes, “Forever I shall be a stranger to myself”.44 For him, strangeness is 
inherent to identity, indicating an existential quality of “foreignness” that dislocates us from 
ourselves, a difference that, while always singular, is a universal existential trait.
45
 
Throughout his interest in strangeness – The Stranger and The Plague, for example, explore 
both the vulnerability of the outsider and the capacity to resist forced separation – Camus 
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proposes what can be regarded as a compellingly cosmopolitan notion of belonging and 
relating to others that transforms experienced contradictions into narratives of our 
paradoxical condition. In order to live with “strangers” without fearing or erasing their 
existential difference, Camus suggests, we must acknowledge the stranger within ourselves 
and the strangeness that is exposed by the absurdity of the human condition.
46
 The point here 
is to both accept and refuse the status of “stranger” as a heightened sensibility of 
cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan is attentive to the ways that we traverse the fine line 
between critical distance and exclusion, between a belonging with others that respects 
difference and a separation from others that debases plurality. This disposition is needed for a 




 The second feature of a Camusian cosmopolitanism is devoted to solidarity as well as 
the deepening and widening of hospitality. Solidarity means, according to Camus, acting to 
support others when threatened by injustice and coercively imposed inequality. It is a kind of 
mutual responsibility motivated by the desire “to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice 
of the human condition”.48 Solidarity is, moreover, an expression of justice as a form of love 
and not merely an abstract ideal: “if justice has any meaning in this world”, Camus says, “it 
means nothing but the recognition of that solidarity; it cannot, by its very essence, divorce 
itself from compassion . . . [the] awareness of a common suffering”.49 Compassion is a 
component of solidarity in that it motivates the move from simple acknowledgement of and 
sympathy for another’s suffering to the choice to take a stand and suffer with others, even if 
those others are strangers. It is a kind of “insane generosity . . . which unhesitatingly gives the 
strength of its love and without a moment’s delay refuses injustice”.50 Inasmuch as it reflects 
an a-teleological relinquishing of hope, the move to solidarity means “laying claim to a 
human situation in which all the answers are human”.51 Thus solidarity is a sign of the 
cosmopolitan’s critical, judging recognition that the world is shared with others and that one 
is able selectively to put oneself in the “stranger’s” place. The imaginative capacity to put 
oneself in another time and place, when linked with solidaristic concern for the suffering and 
humiliation of others, reinforces the compassionate bonds needed to strengthen hospitality as 
an existential affect, rather than simply a formal rule or principle. This is because the 
conjunction of strangeness and solidarity points to a process of inversion between the roles of 
guest and host; self and other are shaped by their exchange of different perspectives which 
then recasts their relationship as a form of mutual giving and receiving – a welcoming of the 
strange. As explored in Camus’s haunting short story, “The Guest [L’Hote]”, the convergence 
of different horizons of experience unsettles the neat separation between “native” host and 
“foreign” guest, even as hospitality cannot escape from the dilemmas confronting every 
concrete space of encounter.
52
 The cosmopolitan thus remains a stranger in search of 
transitory refuge and hospitality in an even stranger yet perplexingly familiar world. 
                                                 
46
 For a nuanced treatment of Camus’s complex French-Algerian identity, see D. Carroll, Albert Camus the 
Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
47
 For a different approach to this issue, see K. A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). 
48
 Camus, The Rebel, 285. 
49
 A. Camus, “Reflections on the Guillotine”, in Resistance, Rebellion and Death, 217. 
50
 Camus, The Rebel, 304. 
51
 Camus, The Rebel, 21. 
52




 A third aspect of a Camusian cosmopolitanism is expressive of his commitment to an 
aesthetic or artistic, rather than strictly philosophical, method. Camus considers the act of 
contemplating experience to be a fundamentally aesthetic encounter with the absurdity of 
existence, as well as a creative process of interpreting and translating the interplay between 
(inter)subjective experience and the world as a carrier of differences.
53
 Hence, cosmopolitan 
dispositions can be viewed not just as formal moral imperatives, but as complex everyday 
aesthetic interactions that witness, imagine and stimulate our critical attention towards and 
awareness of others and our varied places in the world without furnishing unified answers. 
Moreover, this way of framing our encounters with the world prompts attention to the crucial 
role of communication and dialogue. For Camus, the prospect of avoiding unnecessary 
suffering always rests on the possibility, fragile though it is, of dialogue. The dialogical 
exchange of positions and perspectives helps avoid distorting others’ experiences and 
imposing solutions that undermine the freedom of interlocutors. Dialogue offers a way out of 
the impasse between a privileged access to rational truth and a fundamentalist 
incommensurability of conflicting ideologies. Both positions, for Camus, foster totalizing 
visions of the world and its perfectibility. In contrast, he suggests that we must understand 
ourselves as existing constantly in the midst of uninterrupted dialogue, an attitude that 
reflects the acknowledgment of fallibility that comes from embracing the absurd. Camus adds 
that dialogue is a “perpetually renewed” opening to the different and the imperfect at the 
limits of our existing forms of thinking and acting with others.
54
 Dialogue can open up spaces 
for questioning and change without postulating transcendent values to which our thinking and 
acting must conform. There can be no guarantee that dialogue will deepen solidarity within 
and across borders. Yet cosmopolitanism, if it abandons its teleological hopes, will invite 
“untrammelled dialogue through which we come to recognize our similarity” as partners 
living in a common world without pursuing a determinate endpoint.
55
 
 A final feature to mention here is that solidarity, compassion, hospitality and dialogue 
open the pathway to friendship as a material manifestation of the cosmopolitan disposition. 
Against the assumption that friendship signals a bond subsisting upon homogeneity,
56
 
Camus’s understanding points to the fact that friendship is always a relationship and 
negotiation of differences that subverts any sense of unconditional identity purified of the 
strange or foreign.
57
 Camus invites us to envisage friendship as an encounter between self 
and other(s) that offers an alternative to the rule-bound and institutionalized practices of 
formal politics; to befriend another is to enter into the familiarity of strangeness. To turn to 
friendship as a place of cosmopolitan encounter thus serves as a point of resistance against 
the teleological problem-solving model of political efficacy according to which contemporary 
normative cosmopolitanism has increasingly defined itself. Friendship is not a given, but is a 
product of moral choice exercised in the midst of uncertainty and ambiguity, which thus 
avoids the extremes of “natural” enmity for other peoples and “natural” chauvinism for one’s 
own.
58
 As the examples of his “Letters to a German Friend” and his endeavour to negotiate a 
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“civilian truce” during the Algerian conflict attest,59 Camus believes that friendship is 
coextensive with the juxtaposition of mutual dependency and deep plurality that is 
constitutive of social coexistence – even if that coexistence takes threatening turns. 
Friendship is thus an integral element of a cosmopolitan sensibility that remains “faithful to 
the world”.60 In other words, friendship preserves the world as the only common ground that 




Contemporary cosmopolitanism makes a valiant attempt to rescue the individual from the 
vicissitudes of global injustice and inequality. But there is something awry in a philosophical-
political enterprise that construes itself as engaged in the Promethean realization of a new, 
preconceived humanity. In treating humanity as a technical problem to be solved, it amounts 
to “an accusation of earthly things and man” and hence is “without love” for the world as 
such.
61
 For Camus, by contrast, the lucid acceptance of the absurd predicament of the human 
condition is entwined with a refusal of any idea of progress that promises to evade the absurd 
with the mastery offered by millenarian political projects.
62
 “Real generosity toward the 
future”, Camus declares, “lies in giving all to the present”.63 It is only once we acknowledge 
that there is no conclusive basis for hoping that a global cosmopolitan society will be 
achieved at the end of an unbroken chain of “tomorrows” that an a-teleological cosmopolitan 
disposition “free of all messianic elements and devoid of any nostalgia for an earthly 
paradise” comes into its own.64 To validate an absurd love of the world and dislocate the 
authority of a calculated future, then, let us reclaim Camus’s Sisyphean understanding of the 
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